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The Supreme Court of Ohi has recently decided that in a
civil action for the recovery of money the plaintiff may, on the
Attachment ground that the defendant is a non-resident of the
'state, have an attachment against the property of
a defendant partnership, all the members of which reside out

of the state, though it was formed for the purpose of carrying
on business in the state, and has a usual place of doing busi0ness therein: Byers v. Schiupe, 38 N. E. Rep. 117

The Court of Appeals of England has lately held that, inasmuch as the acceptor of a bill of exchange has the full three
days of grace in which to pay it, when payment is
Billsof
Exchange

refused by the acceptor at any time of the last day

of grace, the holder, though at once entitled to give notice of

dishonor to the drawer and indorser, has no cause of action
against either the acceptor or the other parties to the bill until
the expiration of that day, because the acceptor may repent
before it expires; and that an action brought by 'the holder
against the acceptor on the last day of grace must be dismissed
as premature: Kennedy v. Twmas, [189412 Q. B. 759. This
seems at variance with the decision of the Supreme Court of
Idaho in Sabin v. Burke, 37 Pac. Rep. 35Z, noticed in i Am.

L. !EG.

& REV. (N. S.) 758.
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The c6urts are now full of the echoes of the great railroad
insurrection, and never, perhaps, has the strike question been
legally reviewed in so many of its protean aspects.
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of
California in So. Cal. Ry. v. Rutheord, 62 Fed. Rep. 796,
.had occasion, to pass upon one very interesting 'phase of the
problem; and held that, when emplby~s of a railroad, though
staying in its service, refuse to operate trains- hauling certain
cars (in this case Pullmans), though the company is bound
'by contract to carry them, thus interrupting interstate commerce and the transmission of the mails, and subjecting the
company to suits and great and irreparable damage, an
-injunction will issue to compel them to perform their duties
while they remain in the service of the company. This is in
full harmony with the case of the Toledo A. A. & N. M. Ry.
Co. v. Penna. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 746; but such an interference
with the putative right of every one to do as he pleases, irrespective of the legal rights of others, will assuredly rouse the
ire of our congressional demagogues.

The constantly varying circumstances which affect the relations of common- carriers to the public and to each other,
never fail to give new aspects to those relations.
Carriers,
Delivery of The Supreme Court of Tennessee has just decided
(oods
a case which seems to be one of first impression:
Stewart v. Gracey, 27 S. W. Rep. 664, in which it ruled, that the
mere delivery of warehouse receipts to a common carrier, with
an order for delivery of the goods, but without a bill of lading,
-is not a constructive delivery of the goods, so as to render the
carrier liable in case the goods are burned in the warehouse
before it can remove them, though it entered the receipt on
its books, and has commenced to remove the goods. LEA and
.CALDWELL, JJ., dissented, however, and the opposite doctrine
would seem to have much to recommend it. Granting that
the mere delivery of the warehouse receipts to the carrier
wckild impose no duty on it, if it remained-passive, its acts in
ifh 5 case would seem to amount to an acceptance of the goods
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for the purpose of carriage; and there cannot well be an
acceptance without a previous delivery.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has lately held, that a
deviation from the stipulated route, in order to avoid delay,
Liability for because it is impossible to follow the regular route
on account of floods, does not render the carrier an
Deviation
from Route insurer, and therefore liable for the delay that may
be caused by such deviation: International & G. N. R. Ca. v.
Wentwortk, 27 S. W. Rep. 68o. This doctrine is a just one,
,especially in view .of the fact that when the carrier undertakes
the shipment of perishable goods (such as live stock), and their
transportation is delayed by an obstruction on the main line,
such as a washout, but the railroad has a way around the
obstruction, by which delay could be avoided, the company
will be liable to the shipper for any damages caused by delay, if
that way is not followed: Receivers of Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Olive, (Tex.), 23 S. W. Rep. 526. But if the carrier knows at
the time of its undertaking to transport the goods that part of
its route is obstructed by floods, the existence of such floods
is not such an act of God as will relieve it from liability for
injuries to the goods while carried on another route: Adams
Exp. Co. v. Jackson, (Tenn.), 21 S. W. Rep. 666. It is true,
however, that by a wilful deviation from an agreed route, not
caused by stress of unavoidable circumstances, the carrier
becomes an insurer, and- cannot invoke the benefit of any
exceptions in its behalf in the contract of carriage: Robertson
v. Nat'l S. S. Co., Ltd., 17 N. Y. Suppl. 459.
According to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in
Rogers v. Kennebec Steamboat Co., 29 Atl. Rep. io69, one
Limitation of who accepts and uses a free pass, as a pure gratuity, on condition that he will assume all risk of
Liabi.lity
personal injury, must be deemed to have accepted it on that
condition, whether he reads it or not; such a contract is not
against public policy, and will exonerate- the carrier from all
liability for the negligence of its servants. This case was
decided on the authority of Qitdmby v. Boston & -Ve. R. R.,
15o Mass. 365; S. C., 23 N. E. Rep. 205, and Griswold v.
N. Y.&. N.E.R.R., 53 Conn. 371; S. C., 4 Atl. Rep. 261.
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The rule is a fair one, for such a passenger is a mere licensee,
to whom the company owes no duty; but it has been extended
rather unwarrantably, to the case of a drover or other shipper
of goods, who attends them in order to care for his property
while in transit: ZcCawley v. Furness Ry. Co., 8 L. R. Q. B.
57; Poncher v. N. Y Cent. R. R., 49 N. Y. 263. This is
denied, however, by the courts of other states and by the
federal courts: Pa. R. R. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315; Cleveland, &c., R. R. v. Curran, i9 Ohio, i; R. R. v. Lockwood,
17 Wall. 357; Ry. Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655; with good.
reason, for the shipper certainly gives some consideration for
his pass, by relieving the carrier, to a certain extent, of the
care of his goods. The general rule also extends to the case
of a street car passenger, riding on a pass: Muldoon v. Seattle
City Ry. Co., 7 Wash. 528; S. C., 35 Pac. Rep. 422. It does
not apply, however, to the case of a government mail clerk-:Seyboldt v. N. Y, L. E. & W. R. R., 95 N.Y. 562; and some
courts deny its validity in toto: G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
McGown, 65 Test. 640.
The Circuit Court for the Western District of North Carolina has decided, in Porter v. Davidson, 62 Fed. Rep. 626,
that property in possession of a sheriff under
process issued by a state court, cannot be taken
out of his possession in an action of claim and -delivery instituted in a federal court.
Conflct of
Jurisdiction

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of New York, a city
ordinance which provides that if a dog attacks a person, a
Constitutional police justice may, on complaint made, order the
Law
owner to kill the dog immediately, and impose
a fine for failure to obey the order, but which does not require
that notice and opportunity to be heard be given the owner,
is void, as depriving of property without due process of law,
since dogs are property in New York: Peo. v. Tighe, 3o N. Y.
SuppI. 368.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has just decided, in Burke

81o
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v. Territory, 37 Pac. Rep. 829, that the power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts of record that
Contempt
the legislature has no power, in the absence of
constitutional restrictions, to limit or regulate the inherent
power of the courts to punish for contempt; and that a publication made while a- matter is- pending in court, charging
directly that the action of the court in regard to that matter is
an effort to browbeat the grand jury; an effort to bend the
grand jury to the will of the judge; is a contempt. This is in
full accord with the general rule on the subject, that '- when
a publication in a newspaper, being read by jurors and attendants in courts, would have a tendency to interfere with the
proper and unbiassed administration of the laws in pending
cases, it may be adjudged a contempt -and punished accordingly :" State v. Judge of Civil District Court, 45 La. An.
1250; S. C., 14 So. Rep. 31o. This subject is fully treated in
an annotation in 32 Am. L. REG. & REv. lO46, on the case of
Peo. v. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568; S. C., 33 Pac. Rep. 167.
See also State v. Waugh, (Kans.), 37 Pac. Rep. 165.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has lately 'held that
an agreement. by a grandfather to pay his daughter $20,000,
and her son $ io,ooo when he comes of age, if she
Contracts,
Public Policy will permit the son to live with him' and be educated by him, she to see .him whenever she desires, is not void
as against public policy: Enders v. Enders, 30 AUt. Rep. 129.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has carved out an
interesting exception to the general rule in regard to contracts
Restraint in restraint of trade, by ruling, in Anheuser-Busch
of Trade
Brewing Ass'n v. Houck, 27 S. W. Rep. 692,
..(i )that a combination of persons and firms in a city for the
control of the sale of beer and the cessation of competition
inter se, is not void at common law as against public policy,
although in restraint .of trade, since beer is not an article of
prime necessity, and its sale is closely restricted by public
policy; and (2) that a contract by a brewing association to
furnish beer to a dealer in a city in bulk, and not to furnish it
in bulk "to any other party" in said city, for one year, is not
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void as against public policy and in restraint of trade, so as to
prevent a recovery for beer sold thereunder.
The reasoning by which the first branch of the above decision is supported, sufficiently exposes the flimsiness of the
.argument by which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sought
to bolster up its decision in the case of Nester v. Continental
.Brewing Co., 161 Pa. 473; S. C., 34 W. N. C. 387; 29 Atl.
Rep. IO2, if, indeed, that flimsiness is not so patent as to
require no effort to point it out. It is difficult to speak
:seriously of a decision which compares beer' to breadstuffs,
and speaks of a combination to restrain its sale as being
injurious to the public interests. There never was a clearer
case of sticking in the bark. There is an excellent annotation
-on the Nester Case, by G. Herbert Jenkins, in i AM. L. REG.
& REv. (N. S.) 639.
So far as the second branch of the decision is concerned, it
-rests on substantially the same grounds as the first; but is
'liable to be affected by a greater variety of considerations, as
was the case, for instance, in Niagara Falls Brewing Co. v.
Wall, (Mich.), 57 N. W. Rep. 99, where it was held that
:a retail liquor dealer, who has failed to pay a state license tax,
.and is actually engaged in illegal traffic, cannot recover from
-a brewing company for its breach- of a contract to sell its beer
-exclusively to him in a designated town.
The Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts has
-ruled, in Littleton v. Ditson, 62 Fed. Rep. 597, that the proviso
in § 3 of the Copyright Act of March 31, 1891,
Copyright that, "in the case of a book, pllotograph, chromo,
-or lithograph," the two copies required to be delivered to the
Librarian of Congress shall be manufactured in this country,
,does not include musical compositions published in book form,
-or made by lithographic process.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has lately decided that
the liability of the directors of a corporation, under a charter
providing that if the corporate indebtedness shall
Corporations exceed the capital stock paid
in, the directors
.assenting thereto shall be individually liable for such excess,
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is solely for such excess of indebtedness, and to all thecreditors of the corporation; and that, therefore, a portion
only of the latter cannot maintain an action for their individual debts- Moidton v. Corndll-Hall-McLesterCO., 27 S. W..
Rep. 672. Truly, a curious doctrine !
The Supreme Court of Indiana has recently passed upon a.
very-interesting question of criminal law, in Beasley v. State,.'
criminal Law 38 N.

E. Rep. 35, in which case it held that when,

Husband and a husband takes the personal propetty of his wife,.

Wife
under circumstances which would constitute larceny if he were a third person, he is'guilty of that offence.
This is correct beyond a doubt, in the present state of thelaws relating_ to the property of married women ; but imagine
the sensations of the sages of the common law, if such a doctrine had been propounded to them. The same has been.
held with regard to arson: Garrett v. State, 1O9 Ind. 527;
S. C., io N. E. Rep. 570. See, however, Snyder v. Peo.,.
26 Mich. io6.
In the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division of England,.
as given in Queen v. Silverlock, [18941 2 Q. B. 766i a count
Pleading,

in an indictment for obtaining a check by false-

pretences, which charges that the defendant, by
False
Pretences causing a fraudulent advertisement to be inserted
in a newspaper, did falsely pretend to the subjects of her
Majesty the Queen, that

.

.

.

by means of which last

mentioned false pretence he obtained from A. a check, was.
sufficient, though it did not allege the false pretence to havebeen made to any particular person.
According to the Supreme Court of Alabama, detinue lie.
by a vendee of oxen delivered to him under an.
Detinue
executed contract of sale, but afterwards wrongfully seized by the vendor: Barnhkill v. Howard, 16 So. Rep. i.
The Supreme Court of New York maintains, that a threat
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,bythe widow of a decedent that she will take his body to a
certain place for burial, unless his mother assigns
Duress
a policy on decedent's life to her, is not such
-duress as will vitiate the assignment: Jewelers' League of City
.of New York v. De Forest,30 N. Y. Suppl. 88.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has lately
,ruled, that when one conveys to a railroad company a right of
Easements, way through his land, so as to cut off access
Ways of to a part thereof, he has a right of way of necesNecessity
sity over the land conveyed: N. Y & N. E.
R. Co. v. Board of R. R. Corrs., 38 N. E. Rep. 27; but the
.Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has held, that no right of
way from necessity exists across the remaining land -of a
grantor, when the land to which such right of way is claimed
is surrounded on three sides by the sea: Kingsley v. Goulds.borough Land I n. Co., 29" Atl. Rep. 1074. The same has
been held in the case of a grant of an island: Lawton v.
Rivers, 2 McCord (S. C.), 445 ; Turnbull v. Rivers, 3 McCord
-(S. C.), 131.
. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Johnson v. State,
I6
So. Rep. 99, reasserts the principle of evidence, abundantly
supported by the cases cited, that when a declaraEvidence,
tion of the deceased, made when he is not in fear
Dying
of immediate death, is subsequently reaffirmed by
Deciarations
him when he believes death to be imminent, or " in the con:sciousness of impending dissolution," it is admissible as a dying
declaration, though not re-read to him at the tithe of reaffirmance. The same doctrine was held in Peo. v. Crews, (Cal.),
36 Pac. Rep. 367. Of course, if the declaration is read over
to the deceasbd before its reaffirmance, there is no doubt as
to its admissibility: Million v. Com., (Ky.), 25 S.W. Rep. 1059.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently
decided, that photographs, taken three hours after the comrhission of a homicide, showing the condition of the
premises on the discovery of the crime, and satisfactorily verified, are admissible, though the killing be admitted,
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as the), may naturally be expected to aid the jury in understanding the situation of affairs at the time and place of thecommission of the crime: Cor. v. Robertson, 38 N. E. Rep. 25.
The Supreme Court of New York, following the Rauschler
Case, 19 U. S. 407, holds that under the extradition treaty
Extradition

between the United States and Great Britain, a

person extradited from England for assault with.
intent to murder, cannot be convicted of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm. The judge who delivered,
the opinion (on kabeas corpus, at special term) expressly
declined to pass upon the question as to the effect of a
conviction of a less crime involved in that upon the accu-sation of which extradition was had, on the ground that
under the New York statute the latter crime was not included
in the former, and that, therefore, that question did not enterinto the case. He declined to discharge the prisoner, how-.
ever, and remanded him to await the decision of the general
term on the legality of the conviction: Peo. v. Hannan,.
30 N. Y. Suppl. 370. It is to be hoped that that decision
will be against the prisoner, in order that the questionable
decision in the Rauscher case may have a thorough re-examination, and, if possible, a reversal. See remarks up'on thiscase in an article entitled, "The Right to Try an Extradited
Criminal for an Offence other than that Specified in the Extradition Proceedings," in 28 Am. L. Rev. 568.
Judge Morrow, of the District Court for the Northern District of California, has recently held, in the case of the Salvadorian fugitives, lt re Erzeta, &c., 62 Fed. Rep.
Political
Offences

964, that the jurisdiction of a judge, sitting as a

committing magistrate in a case in which fugitives are charged
with extraditable crimes, is in no way affected by, and he will
not inquire into, the manner in which the persons 'o charged
came or were brought into the United States; and in In re
E.eta, &c., 62 Fed. Rep. 972, that the committing magistrate
has jurisdiction, and it is his duty, to determine whether the
offence charged is political, and not subject to extradition;
that offences committed by officers of the party in possession of
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the government, during the progress of an attempted revolution, and the existence of active hostilities between the contending parties, are political, and not extraditable; and that
offences within the jurisdiction of military law, which for the
time being supersedes the common law, are not extraditable.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has ruled in Simmang
v. Hars,27 S. W. Rep. 786, that a sale of land will not be
rescinded on the ground of fraud merely because
Fraud,
Rescission the grantor, in the abstract of title furnished the
vefidee before the sale, omitted a portion of a will, which is
claimed to restrict the title of the grantor to a life estate,
when the will is on record, and the construction of the part
omitted involves a technical knowledge of the law.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has ranged itself on the
side of those who claim that the laws forbidding the possesGame
sion of game out of season apply to game killed
lawfully, either in the state of sale, and kept in
storage,'or imported from a state having a different close season: State v. Rodman, 59 N. W. Rep. 1o98. The cases on
this subject are collected in i Am. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 75 .
The Supreme Court of Alabama has very properly decided
in a recent case, that when a police officer illegally arrests a
Garnishment person, and takes possession of his money and
effects, these are not subject to garnishment in
the hands of such officer by a creditor of the person arrested,
there being no contractual relation between the officer and
such person: Cunninghamv. Baker, 16 So. Rep. 68; and the
Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled, that a "commercial
traveller," whose business it is to travel and sell goods for his
employer, though employed and paid for his services by the
day, is not a "day laborer," and his wages are not therefore
exempt from garnishment under Ga. Code, § 3554.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa, when two
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persons are charged in the same indictment with murder in
the
first degree, the conviction of one of murder
.Z
Homicide
in the second degree wilt not prevent the trial of

the other for the crime as charged in the indictment: State
v. Lee, 6o N. W. Rep. I19.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri, as
expressed in Havens v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 27 S. W.
Rep. 718, the words "wholly destroyed," used in

reference to a building, in either a statute or an
insurance policy, must be taken to mean that the building is
totally destroyed, as such, though there is not an absolute
extinction of all its parts, and that a building is none the less
"wholly destroyed " because part of the machinery had been
removed therefrom pending repairs, and stored in another
building, not exposed to the fire.
There is a very valuable article on the effect of these words,
in relation to insurance, by M. C. Phillips, Esq., in 33 Cent.
Insurance

L. J. 319.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, following the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Lascelles v. Georgia,
148 U. S. 537; S. C., 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 687, has
Interstate
Rendition
lately reaffirmed the rule that a person extradited
from another state of the Union may be tried on a charge
other than that on which he was extradited, without first
being tried on the latter, or given a chance to return to the
state which surrendered him: Carrv. State, 16 So. Rep. 150,
155.
One would have thought that the decision of the
Supreme Court would have settled this question finally,
especially as it was so thoroughly consonant with principle
and with the weight of prior authority. But it seems to be a
stock subject of exception in all cases to which it applies,
something like the general exception in civil cases, "because
the judge failed to charge in favor of the defendant."
The general rule has also been upheld recently in State v.
Keai, (Iowa). 56 N. W. Rep. 283, on the authority of Stat
v. Ross 21 Iowa. 467, a case of kidnapping; a conviction of
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petit larceny has been held valid where the defendant was surrendered on a charge of grand larceny: State v. Walker, (Mo.),
24 S. W. Rep. I oll; and a similar conviction for a less crime*
was held legal in Comm. v. Johnston, (Pa.), 2 D. R. 673; S. C.,
12 Pa. C. C. 263. It has been ruled, in Minnesota, that the
mere fact of interstate rendition will not exempt the defendant
from civil prosecution while detained under such proceedings,
though, of course, it would be different if the rendition process
were a mere contrivance to bring the defendaint within the
reach of civil process; and that the principle 6f public policy
which exempts a witness or party appearing voluntarily from
the service of civil process in such cases, in order to further
the ends of justice by encouraging such appearance, does not
apply when the presence of the party is compulsory: Rdid v.
Ham, 56 N. W. Rep. 35; S. C., 54 Minn. 305. The cases
on the subjec will be found collected in an article on this and
kindred subjects, in 28 Am'. L. Rev. 568.
Both the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Civil
Appeals of the same state agree, that a judge is not disqualified from hearing a case, merely because his
Judge'
Disqualifica-

. tlon

brother, who is attorney for one of the parties,

has a contingent interest in the result of the suit,

due to his having agreed with his client for a contingent fee:
Winston v. AMasterson, 27 S.W. Rep. 691, 768. This is a
very sensible view of the matter, much more reasonable than
the decision in Howell v. Budd, 91 Cal. 342; S. C., 27 Pac.
Rep. 747, where it was held that the sons of a judge, who
agree to try a case for a contingent fee, are parties within the
meaning of the statute, sufficient to disqualify their .father from
trying the case.
There is no affinity between the blood relations of the husband and the blood relations of the wife; and hence the
brother of the husband may lawfully preside at the trial of
the wife's brother for the commission of a crime: Exp. Harris,
26 Fla. 77. A judge, the brother-in-law of a stockholder of
a corporation, who is also its president, is not disqualified by
that relation to try a suit to which the corporation is a party:
52
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Lewis v. Hillsboro Roller Mil Co., (Tex.), 27 S. W. Rep. 338.
So, also, a guardian ad litem is not a party to the suit, but an
officer of the court; and a surrogate is not disqualified to act
on the probate of a will, because his brother has been appointed
guardian ad litem of an infant party: In re Van Wagonen's
Will, 69 Hun. 365; S. C., 23 N. Y. SuppL 636.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, when
jurors, after agreeing on a verdict-, and before its return, go
into a saloon, and are there treated by lawyers for
both sides, such conduct is no cause for q new

trial, since both parties are in pari delicto: McLaugldin v.
Hinds, 38 N. E. Rep. 136. Quere, as to the effect if one
lawyer stood more of the expense than the other, or if one,'
on the plea of having no money, got the other to stand the
whole treat?
The Chancery Division of England has recently decided,
that a covenant in a lease that the lessee will not carry on a
business similar to that of another tenant of the
Lease,
covenant

same lessor, is not violated by maintaining a lunch

counter for the sale of tea, coffee, pastry and cold meat, without a license for the sale of intoxicants, while the other tenant
carried on a regular licensed restaurant, for the sale of all sorts
of eatables and liquors, the former establishment being also
much smaller, and theprices considerably lower: Drew v. Guy,
[1894] 3 Ch. 25.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has lately passed
upon a rather unusual state of affairs, arising from a modesty
aa , one does not look for nowadays in a public officialMandamus,
Acceptance of
Office

The office of governor of that state had become
vacant, and the duty of filling the vacancy devolved

upon the president of the Senate, who, however, refused to
accept. But the court held that he might be compelled by
,mandamus to perform the duties of the office: Barnard v.
Taggart, 29 Atl. Rep. 1O2 7 . This is in line with the rule
which holds that mandamus will lie to compel the acceptance
of a municipal office by one who, possessing the necessary
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qualifications, has been duly elected thereto: Peo. v. Williams,
(Ill.), 33 N. E. Rep. 849.
The Supreme Court of Washington holds, in conformity
with the general rule, that a municipal corporation will not be
compelled by mandamus to award a contract to
Award o
Contract
the lowest bidder for city work, even though *such
contracts are by law required to be let to the lowest bidder:
Times Pub. Co. v. Everett, 37 Pac. Rep. 695. Afortiori,When
there is no such statutory obligation, mandamus will not lie:
State v. Lincoln Co., 35 Neb. 346; S. C., 53 N. W. Rep. 147;
State v. Dixon Co., 24 Neb. io6; S. C., 37 N. W. Rep. 936.
According to the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Scoville, 62 Fed.
Rep. 730, the wanton and malicious use of the
steam whistle of a locomotive, by servants of
a railroad company, who are in charge of the locomotive, while
it is in motion on a regular or authorized run, is an act within
the scope of their -employment, so far as to charge the company
with liability for injuries caused thereby.
laster
and Servant

The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Gregory v.
Lee, 30 AtI. Rep. 53, has ruled, that when a minor contracts
for the lease of a room, and leaves after occupying
it for part of the period covered by the lease, he
cannot be compelled to pay for- the remaining time; because,
granting that the room was a necessary, the contract therefore
was still liable to be rescinded at the election of the minor, and.
was in fact so rescinded by his ceasing to occupy the room.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holds,
that when a municipal body has lawful authority to issue bonds
or other negotiable securities, dependent only upon
Municipal
Corporations, the adoption of certain preliminary proceedings,
Estoppel
and the adoption of those proceedings is certified,
on the face of the bonds, by the body to which the law
entrusts the power, and upon which it imposes the duty, to
ascertain, determine and certify this fact, before or at the time
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of issuing the bonds, such a certificate will estop the municipality, as against a bona fide purchaser of the bonds, from
proving its falsity, in order to defeat them: Nat. L. Ins. Co.
of Montpelier v. Board of Education of City of -uron, 62 Fed.
Rep. 778.
While, as we have seen, the Supreme Court of Washington
denies the right of the lowest bidder on a, municipal-contract
to maintain mandamus to compel the award of the
Contracts,
InJunction

contract to him, it acknowledges the fact that if

such bidder be a. tax-payer, he may sue as such to enjoin the
performance of a contract awarded to a higher bidder, though
his action is prompted by other considerations than his liability
to excessive taxation : Times Pub. Co. v. Everett, 37 Pac. Rep.
6g95. This decision is an extension of the doctrine asserted in
Mazet v. Pittsburg, 137 Pa. 548; S. C., 2a Ati. Rep. 693.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware has lately
leld, that coasting on the streets of a town is a public nuisance,
irrespective of an ordihance of the city council
declaring it to be such; and that the neglect of

the police to abate the nuisance will not render the town liable
to one injured by a person coasting, while passing along the
street: Wilmington v. Vandegrift, 29 At. Rep. rO47. "
The Queen's Bench Division has decided, that a bungalow,
constructed of wood and corrugated iron, erected on a piece of
Power,
land, for the purpose of exhibition and sale, not
Buildings " used or occupied, nor intended to be used or occupied on the spot where erected, is not a wooden structure, or
erection of a movable or temporiary character, under the
English statute, and does not require a license for its erection:
London County Council v. Humphreys, Ltd., [18941 2 Q. B.
755The Supreme Court of South Dakota has also recently
rendered an interesting decision in -regard to the powers of
municipal corporations over property within their limits, in
City of Sioux Falls v. Kelly, 6o N. W. Rep. 156, to the effect
that: (i) A municipal corporation possesses only these powers,
viz.: those granted in express terms; those necessarily and
fairly implied, or incident to the powers expressly granted;
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and those essential to the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
(2) The right of a person to exercise dominion over his own
property, and to build upon and improve the same, in accordance with the general laws of the land and municipal ordinances
applicable alike to all citizens of a city, is secured by the
fundamental principles of the constitution; and he cannot be
compelled by the municipal government under which he lives
to hold that right subject to the power of granting or refusing
a permit to build upon or otherwise improve his property,
vested in a city building inspector, from whose decision there
is no appeal. . (3) According to these principles a municipal
ordinance, which prescribes that before any person can erect
any building, or any addition thereto, within the city limits, he
must first apply to and obtain from the city building inspector
a permit, to be granted or refused at his pleasure, providing
for no appeal frm his decision, and subjecting the owner to a
penalty in case he builds without such permit, violates the
constitutional rights of the citizen, in that it makes the right
of the owner of property to improve and use the same dependent upon the decision of the city building inspector, and is
therefore void. This, of course, applies only where, as in the
present case, there is no express grant of a power to pass such
an ordinance. There can be no question as to the ability of
the legislature to confer such power.
According to the Appellate Court of Indiana, when the
public have been accustomed to travel a- well-defined road
across the land of a private person, though no
Negligence
right of way by user has been acquired, the
owner is liable for injuries caused by stretching a barbed wire,
not visible after dark, across such way, without anything to
warn travellers of its existence: Morrow v. Sweeney, 38 N. E.
Rep. 187. The Supreme Court of Vermont has recently announced a very salutary doctrine, in Judd v. Ballard, 3o Ati.
Rep. 96, to the effect that it is actionable negligence for a
person, while adjusting the handle of a loaded revolver, to
hold it so that an accidental discharge will injure another;
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and that if he does so hold it, he will be liable for any injury
that may result.
The decision of the Court of Appeals of England, in Lemvzon v. Webb, [1894] 3 Ch. i, will prove very interesting to
all owners of real estate, but more especially to
those whose property is of limited extent. In
that case, large boughs of old trees standing on Lemmon's
land had for more than twenty years overhung Webb's land;
but finally Webb, without giving Lemmon any notice, cut off
the boughs to the boundary-line. Lemmon then brought
action against Webb, alleging that the latter had no right at
all to cut off anything that had overhung his land more than
twenty ,ears, and that even if he had the right to cut the
branches off, he was not entitled to do so without first giving
notice.
But the court held that the mere fact that the
branches had overhung Webb's land for more than twenty
years gave no right to have them remain in that position, and
that notice wa's not necessary, as Webb did not go on Lemanon's land for the purpose of cutting them off.
The Supreme Court of Alabama is of opinion that an
agreement by which one party is to furnish lumber
and market the same when sawed, and the other
-party is to saw it on halves, makes a partnership: Lee v.
Ryan, 16 So. Rep. 2.
The Chancery Division holds, that when an action is pending for the dissolution of a partnership, on the ground that
the defendant partner is of- unsound mind, the
court will grant an injunction to restrain the
-defendant from interfering in the conduct of the partnership
affairs, so as to injure the business and assets of the firm:
j. v. S., [1894] 3 Ch. 72.
Following the weight of authority, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently decided, that when stock in a corporation has been pledged, and the shares transPledge
ferred on the books to the pledgee, a bill in
equity will lie to redeem the stock upon the refusal of the
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pledgee to retransfer it; because the legal title being vested
in the pledgee by the transfer, the pledgor has no other
remedy: Smitlh v. Anderson, 27 S. W. Rep. 175.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has just ruled, in
Mitchell v. Abbott, 29 AtI. Rep. I I 19, that when the offer of a
reward is not acted on for twelve years, it will be
Rewards
presumed, in the absence of facts showing a contrary intent, that it has been revoked. This is in accord with
the general rule. See an annotation on this subject in i AM.
L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 223.
The reports of the past month are rich in additions to the
legal history of strikes. Judge Grosscup, in his powerful
Strikes
charge to the Federal Grand Jury at Chicago,
reported in In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 Fed.
Rep. 828, set the seal of his disapprobation on the action of
the railroad strikers in no uncertain manner. In his opinion,
the open and active opposition of a number of persons, as in
that case, to the execution of the laws of the United States of
so formidable a nature as to defy for the time being the
authority of the government, constitutes an insurrection,
even though not accompanied by bloodshed, and not of sufficient magnitude to render success probable. This is in'
harmony with the charge of Chief Justice PAXSON, of Pennsylvania, made under similar circumstances, at the time of the
Homestead riots: Homestead Case, (Pa.) in I D. R. 785.
Similarly, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, in Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &. T. P. Ry. Co., 62
Fed. Rep. 803, has decided that a combi'nation to incite all
the railroad employ~s in the country to suddenly quit their
service, without any dissatisfaction with the terms of their
employment, thus paralyzing all railroad traffic, in order to
starve the railroad companies and the public into compelling
an owner of cars used in operating the roads to pay his employ~s more wages, they having no lawful right so to compel
him, is an unlawful conspiracy by reason of its purpose,
whether such purpose is effected by means usually lawful or
otherwise.
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Quite as severe a setback was given to the arrogance of the
strikers, when the Circuit Court for the District of Washington,
in Booth v. Brown, 62 Fed. Rep. 794, held, that when employ6s
of a railroad join in a general strike, without grievance of their
own, for the purpose of compelling, by obstruction of travel
and hindrance of traffic, parties to one side of a pending controversy to yield actual or supposed rights, and leave the service under such circumstances as make it necessary to fill their
places in order to continue the operation of the road, the court
will not, by reason of their past services, direct the receivers to
reinstate them.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently decided
one of the strangest questions that was ever raised in a court
of law, by declaring, in Williams v. Ford,27 S. W.
Subrogation
Rep. 723, that by payment of the services and
expenses of an officer in performing an official act, a person
does not become subrogated to any right in the fees allowed
such officer!
According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas, it is not sufficient for a telegraph company, when the
addressee of a telegram, not sent to the care of any
Telegraphs

one, is not at the place of address, to leave the
telegram at that place, but reasonable diligence must be used
to find him: West Union Tel. Co. v. De Jarles, 27 S. W. Rep.
792.

The Supreme Court of New York holds, that the rule that
where the goods of an innocent person have been wrongfully
mingled with the goods of another so that they
Torts
cannot be separated, the whole bulk will be
awarded to the innocent party, does not apply where the
interests of third persons intervene, and full ptotection can
otherwise be given to the innocent person whose goods were
wrongfully used: Nat. Park Bk. of New York v. Goddard,
30 N. Y. Suppl. 417.
The Supreme Court of Alabama has lately ruled, in Barn-
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kill v. Howard, I6 So. Rep. I, that a collateral agreement
that one of the vendors of a yoke of oxen should
be hired by the vendee at a stipulated price per
day,-" to drive the team and have possession and control
until they are paid for, and as long thereafter as they can
agree," gives possession to such vendor as a driver only, and
he cannot, on non-payment of the price, detain them from the
vendee.
Vendor and
Vendee

